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Abstract: 
Earlier research about the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) focused on its normative value, 
functioning mechanisms, and the extent to which citizens are willing to engage with it. So 
far, little efforts were made to investigate whether the ECI has an effect on citizens’ 
attitudes. This article provides an empirical assessment about how knowledge about the ECI 
and the willingness to use it may enhance a positive image about the EU. The explanatory 
power of these two variables is tested against other determinants identified in the literature 
as sources of a positive image about the EU: democratic performance, perception of 
representation, the pursuit of interests, and citizenship. The study draws on an original 
dataset collected through a web-survey at the beginning of 2015. Results indicate a limited 
and sometimes counter-intuitive effect of the ECI on the image about the EU with several 
implications for the future of this participatory tool.  
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Introduction 
In April 2012 the world’s first tool of transnational participatory democracy, the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), entered into force. Introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECI allows 
European citizens to exercise their right to participate in the political system of the European 
Union (EU). In three years from its introduction, 51 initiatives had been presented to the 
European Commission out of which 31 got registered and only three can be seen as 
successful from a procedural point of view, i.e. they managed to collect more than one 
million signatures (Anglmayer 2015, p.9). The ECI received extensive scholarly attention and 
earlier studies highlighted its limitations and constraints (Maurer & Vogel 2009; Bouza 
Garcia et al. 2012), reflected on its potential impact to build up a European demos 
(Glogowski & Maurer 2013; Hatton 2014) or to strengthen the EU democratic system 
(Hierlemann & Wohlfarth 2010; Sangsari 2013), and referred to the factors leading to its use 
(Kentmen-Cin 2014). The common ground of these approaches is the extent to which 
citizens are encouraged (Monaghan 2012) and willing to engage with a mechanism that is 
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advertised by the European institutions as participatory. However, so far little efforts were 
made to investigate whether the ECI has an effect on citizens’ attitudes.  
To partly fill this void in the literature, this article provides an empirical assessment 
about how the ECI influences individual level attitudes. More precisely, we argue and test 
the extent to which knowledge about the ECI and the willingness to use it may enhance a 
positive image about the EU. The latter covers a broad set of the predicted effects that the 
ECI could have on individual perceptions, e.g. identification with the EU and the building up 
of a European demos, feeling better represented and thinking that the EU listens to the 
voice of its citizens. The explanatory power of these two variables is tested against other 
determinants identified in the literature as sources of a positive image about the EU: 
democratic performance, perception of representation, the pursuit of interests, and 
citizenship. The study draws on an original dataset collected through a web-survey in 
Germany and the United Kingdom at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015, countries 
selected on the basis of their citizens’ different attitudes towards the EU. The individual level 
data are analyzed both through bivariate correlations and ordinal logistic regression. 
The first section of this article provides the conceptual framework and reviews literature, 
which discusses two things:  why democratic innovations are necessary and important for 
contemporary democratic systems and which developments urged the EU to implement 
such mechanisms. This is also where we formulate theoretical-driven hypotheses to be 
tested empirically at a later stage. The second section includes the research design, 
providing details about case selection (according to the Most Different System Design), data 
collection and variable operationalization. The following section presents and interprets the 
empirical findings with an emphasis on the similarities and differences between the two 
countries. The conclusions summarize the main results, shed light on the theoretical and 
empirical implications of this study, and discuss avenues for further research.  
 
The ECI and the image about the EU 
According to Article 10.3 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) every European citizen 
has the right to participate in the democratic life of the EU. In addition to voting in elections 
for the European Parliament, the ECI – introduced through the Treaty of Lisbon – provides a 
supplementary possibility to participate. The ECI falls under the category of citizens’ 
initiatives, a bottom-up type of direct democracy that presupposes an initiative coming from 
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individuals, interest groups, or organizations (Schiller 2002; Beramendi et al. 2008; Altman 
2011). Such initiatives allow citizens to get involved in the legislative process, since it entails 
the right to propose new laws or the modification of existing laws to the general public. The 
ECI is an agenda-setting (or policy-shaping) initiative because it gives European citizens the 
right to place an issue on the agenda for legislative consideration of the European 
Commission without legally binding pressure on the latter (Glogowski & Maurer 2013, p.9).  
It can be used in six ways: to get the EU to do something new, to stop the EU from 
doing something, to make current EU legislation better, to use the ECI as an additional 
element in an attempt to influence European policy making, to use the ECI to build broad 
alliances and networks across Europe and finally to make individual citizens or groups of 
citizens better known in the public sphere (Kaufmann 2012, pp.17–23). However, the ECI 
should not be seen and used as a kind of blockage instrument that hinders EU legislation, 
but rather as a proactive instrument that encourages citizens to actively engage with 
European legislation and projects (Franzius & Preuss 2012, p.27). The successful launch of 
the ECI must meet several criteria: a minimum number of one million signatures from 
citizens living in at least one quarter of the current 28 Member States (or at least 0.2 per 
cent of the EU population to be represented in the initiative) and the proposal to the 
Commission should neither fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers nor to be 
against the values of the Union (Articles 3-11, TEU).  
Although the difficulty to meet these criteria and the weakness of the ECI as a policy 
instrument may discourage citizen involvement (Bouza Garcia & Greenwood 2012; ECI 
Support Centre 2014), there are theoretical reasons to expect that the ECI may influence the 
image citizens have about the EU. These reasons refer to the responsiveness and 
inclusiveness of the EU system and are explained in detail in the following lines.  
 
How can the ECI improve the (public) image of the EU? 
The simplest possible way in which the ECI can positively influence the attitude of citizens 
towards the EU is its success, i.e. proposals end up in legislation or policies. On the contrary, 
if initiatives fail the ECI could have a demotivating effect and deepen the view that citizens’ 
voices do not count in the EU. While such empirical arguments are difficult to test given the 
short life of the ECI and limited number of initiatives, its potential effects are not related to 
the outcome but to the process. There are four interconnected mechanisms which could in 
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theory lead to a better image about the EU when the ECI is implemented: 1) establishing a 
European demos; 2) creating networks across borders and rising media awareness for 
European topics, 3) strengthening the democratic system of the EU and 4) enhancing the 
political inclusion of European citizens.  
First, the ECI can address the problem of popular legitimacy in the EU polity. Bohman 
(2007, p.139) argues that popular legitimacy is achieved when people “have genuine 
opportunities to shape or assent” to reforms. The ECI helps at the creation of a demos is 
constructed and therefore the missing demos of the EU is not a problem as long as there are 
efforts to create the structures and institutions which enable its creation (Hatton 2014, 
p.240). The ECI is likely to provide the institutional channels for increased participation and 
communication of European citizens that activate a bottom-up building of the European 
demos. The possibility to discuss important European issues collectively across borders and 
to act on shared interests with an increased number of participants could lead to a more 
attracting sense of a demos (Glogowski & Maurer 2013; Hatton 2014). Furthermore, rather 
than relying on a single demos as necessary precondition for democracy, the “multiple 
demoi thesis” (Bohman 2007; Cheneval & Schimmelfennig 2013; Hatton 2014) explains that 
manifold and overlapping demoi could serve as base for the transnational democratic 
system of the EU. Citizens would have different sources for identification and different 
membership criteria, based on different preconditions. Thus, the ECI as a collective pan-
European tool for direct participation could serve as a mechanism that stimulates a 
European demos or as a platform where a European demos could be fostered. Thereby, the 
importance of transnational networks and the media as a major source of information for 
many citizens cannot be underestimated. The role of the media is fundamental in the 
process of demos formation and without transnational networks the ECI could hardly be 
conducted (Glogowski & Maurer 2013, p.22). 
Second, transnational networks are among the most important forms of organization 
for a civil society with transnational and issue-specific identity. As these networks do not 
identify (only) national but unified in their relationship to a joint issue, they transcend 
national borders and communicational barriers through deliberation. The ECI as initiator of 
transnational networks could serve as stimulating mechanism for pan-European deliberation 
between the citizens and lead to decision-making processes, identification with a European 
political community and the formation of European public opinion. Through all these the EU 
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becomes more appealing to citizens and fulfills another necessary precondition of 
democracy (Habermas 2001, p.17). In line with these arguments, earlier research indicates 
that the ECI has worked in practice as a tool for organized civil society in the EU (De Clerck-
Sachsse 2012; Bouza Garcia & Greenwood 2014). At the same time, the ECI may provide an 
appropriate platform to start cross border reporting of EU issues without national bias as 
citizens already act collectively and unified in their interest-related identity (Glogowski & 
Maurer 2013, p.21). In this way, a shared sphere of communication through the media 
would be opened up for the citizens.  
Third, the ECI can contribute to the improvement of the institutional design of the EU 
democratic system. Earlier studies concluded that the ECI may make European civil society 
more diverse, representative and oriented to the public sphere (Bouza Garcia & Del Río Villar 
2012). Through its agenda-setting function the ECI is an appropriate tool for the citizens to 
engage with the European project and to ensure that their voices are heard by the body 
initiating legislation in the EU. In this sense, citizens could feel empowered when they are 
allowed to put forward their own legislative proposals. By providing a platform for collective 
communication and action across (European? Member State?) borders, the ECI can endow a 
sense of community and solidarity, which then again makes the voice of the citizens more 
substantial when it comes to EU policy decisions (Franzius & Preuss 2012, pp.35–36). At the 
same time, the use of the ECI could partly address the issue of democratic deficit in the EU. 
It could add legitimacy to its political system and thereby making its decisions more 
ponderous without inflicting protest, anti-European movements or dissatisfaction and 
alienation among its citizens.  
 Finally, the ECI provides the avenue for a better and deeper inclusion of European 
citizens in the EU political process. The concept of political inclusion in the literature, 
traditionally refers to how minority groups or immigrants are included in national political 
systems. Wolbrecht and Hero (2005) view democratic inclusion as influence, representation 
and incorporation of various social groups into the political process. While inclusion can be 
achieved through political parties or voting, full access to participation and representation in 
important decision-making processes and institutions are important signs for full democratic 
inclusion in politics (Schmidt et al. 2002). The ECI has the ability to strengthen the inclusion 
of the citizens in the EU political process by providing an additional participatory tool. 
Political inclusion is also related to the feeling of being heard by the authorities and the ECI 
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could provide such a felling since the Commission is expected to react to successful 
initiatives (Kaldur et al. 2011). In this context, the ECI can partly address the criticisms about 
the EU being distant from its citizens and being characterized by democratic deficit. If 
citizens use it as a channel to express their opinions and influence the EU political system, 
they are likely to have confidence in the possibilities provided by the ECI. At the same time, 
they may also have a positive image about the EU since the latter provided them a tool to 
get involved and participate in the legislative process, to make their voice heard and 
eventually point to changes they would like to see. This is a signal that the EU has the 
intention to improve and react to the needs of its citizens.  
In light of all these arguments, the ECI is likely to enhance among citizens feelings of 
empowerment, belief that their voice can be heard, and confidence in the EU political 
process. These are the reasons for which we expect knowledge about the ECI and the 
willingness to use it to have a positive effect on citizens’ image about the EU. By 
strengthening democracy at the EU level and having a potential impact to limit the 
democratic deficit, the ECI can improve the way in which citizens see the EU. In this paper 
image stands for citizens’ general perceptions and opinions about the EU. Roth and 
Diamantopoulos (2009) argued that a country image is the sum of perceptions, associations, 
stereotypes, or schemas. An image consists of a diffuse or general impression and a set of 
feelings and beliefs about a whole field, and it is less about details or particular facts. 
 
H1: Citizens who know about the ECI have a better image about the EU than the rest. 
H2: Citizens who are willing to use the ECI have a better image about the EU than the rest. 
 
The direction of the hypothesized relationships should be briefly clarified. In other words 
why we expect attitudes towards the ECI to lead to a positive image about the EU and not 
the other way around. The basis of our argument lies in the difference between specific and 
diffuse support (Easton 1965). On the one hand, specific support is object-specific; meaning 
that it involves knowledge about policies, actions and decisions of the authorities. On the 
other hand, the diffuse support derives from experiences that over time produce general 
attitudes towards a political system. As illustrated by this conceptualization, the sequence of 
occurrence is usually from the specific to the diffuse support. Moreover, there is empirical 
evidence that indicates how specific support, as a policy-based evaluation, leads to diffuse 
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support, as more of a normative evaluation. In their study Scheb II and Lyons (1999) show 
how citizens who have specific knowledge about the Supreme Court are also likely to show 
greater support for and better opinions about the Court. According to their conclusions, the 
relationship is in theory possible the other way around, but much weaker and rather unlikely 
in reality.1  
 
Control variables 
We control for the effect of ECI on the image about the EU when ‘the usual suspects’ to 
produce such an effect are kept constant. There are theoretical reasons to believe that four 
determinants may play an important role in shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the EU: 1) 
seeing the EU as a democratic system, 2) feeling represented in the EU, 3) perceiving that EU 
represents citizens’ interests, and 4) EU citizenship. To begin with, citizens vest confidence in 
political institutions when “they believe they operate effectively according to democratic 
principles of justice and impartiality” (Newton 2006, p.86). Accordingly, those citizens who 
consider the EU to be a democratic institution are likely to consider the EU as legitimate 
since legitimacy of political institutions is largely based on trust (Christensen & Lægreid 
2002). While these arguments refer explicitly to specific support (Easton 1965), they are also 
valid when speaking about the diffuse support (i.e. image about the EU). In this sense, 
citizens who trust the democratic processes within the EU politics are less likely to feel 
alienated by and have a negative image about the EU.  
Second, legitimacy refers to the belief that the existing political order is right; but to 
what extent the political system is right also depends on how well it manages to represent 
the citizens (Thomassen & Schmitt 1999, p.9). Representation is the an essence of 
democracy because it enables citizens to forward their interests and needs at political level 
(Pitkin 1967; Manin 1997; Przeworski et al. 1999). At the same time, representation means 
responsiveness of the political system towards citizens, a reflection of their demands into 
policies (Pitkin 1967; Thomassen 1994). Consequently, citizens who feel represented in the 
EU are likely to have a better image about it compared to those who do not feel 
represented. Third, closely related to representation is the feeling that the EU serves the 
                                                        
1 Earlier research highlighted that specific support does not always lead to diffuse support (Iyengar 1980; 
Nicholson & Howard 2003). Our argument here does not contradict such findings but tries to convey the 
message that whenever the two types of support are related, there is a specific sequentiality with specific 
support coming first.  
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interests of its citizens.2 In general, voting reflects the opinions and images citizens hold 
about which party could better serve their interests in office. When institutions and 
authorities are perceived as serving the general interest, then it is also likely that citizens will 
have a good image about them.  
Fourth, creating an EU citizenry has the potential to create a positive image of the EU 
at an individual level. According to Scheuer (1999, p.26), “the growing together of a political 
community depends at least as much on peoples self-perceptions and identifications as on 
the provision of rights of citizenship or on predominant modes of government”. While the 
EU can grant only particular citizenship rights, the creation of citizenry depends on whether 
individuals develop a sense of belonging and identification. Those citizens who do so are 
likely to have more positive attitudes towards the political system in which they activate 
compared to those individuals who do not identify with a broader community. In addition to 
these four determinants, we also test for the potential effect of age, gender, and education 
in shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the EU.  
 
Research design 
To empirically test the hypotheses we use a comparative approach for which we selected 
Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). The two countries were chosen on the basis of two 
variables; the differing attitudes of their citizens towards the EU on the one hand and of 
their relative importance for the EU on the other. According to the 2014 Autumn 
Eurobarometer, in the UK 30% of the population had a positive image of the EU, 35% a 
neutral image, and 32% a negative image. Only Greece (44% negative), Cyprus (38% 
negative) and Austria (36% negative) had a more negative view about the EU. Recent 
developments indicate that the UK will hold a referendum in 2017 regarding the possibility 
to leave the EU.  In contrast, 38% of the German respondents had a positive image of the EU, 
41% a neutral image, and 20% a negative image. There are only few countries, e.g. Poland 
(61% positive), Romania (59%) and Ireland (53%), who had an even better image of the EU. 
On the other hand, the countries were chosen due to the special roles they play in the EU. 
Throughout decades both countries shaped the EU developments and significantly 
influenced the content of treaties.  
                                                        
2 The conceptual line between representation and pursuing general interests is relatively thin. In practice, 
people see the two things as being different. For the respondents included in this study the correlation 
between these two variables is 0.67 in Germany and 0.61 in the UK.  
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The data for our study comes from a web survey conducted between November 2014 
and January 2015 in the two countries. Since there was no available individual level data to 
reflect both the knowledge and willingness to use the ECI (e.g. Eurobarometers never asked 
the two questions together), we developed a questionnaire that included all variables 
specified in this study. The web survey included only multiple-choice answers with five-point 
ordinal scales and respondents had the possibility to skip questions; on average, the 
completion time was approximately five minutes. The survey used identical questionnaires 
in English and German and was shared via e-mail and social networks in both countries. In 
total, 457 respondents filled out the questionnaire: 240 (completion rate 92%) in Germany 
and 217 (completion rate 88%) in the UK. The sample is not probability representative at 
country level and includes mainly young and highly educated respondents. The age group 
between 18 and 25 is overrepresented with 49% of the respondents in Germany and almost 
60% in the UK. At the same time, 91% of the German and 93% of the British respondents 
have their A-Levels or higher. The gender distribution is relatively equal with women 
representing 48% of the respondents in Germany and 43% in the UK. Results cannot be 
generalized to the broader population but they remain illustrative for a particular segment 
of the population.  
 
Variable operationalization and methodology 
Each variable corresponds to a question in the questionnaire. The dependent variable of this 
article is the image about the EU, measured as the answer provided to the following 
question “Do you have a rather positive or rather negative image of the EU?” Available 
answers were coded on a five point ordinal scale and range from “definitely negative” (0) to 
“definitively positive” (4). The knowledge about the ECI (H1) is operationalized as the answer 
to the question: “Have you heard about the European Citizens Initiative?” Possible answers 
were dichotomous (“yes” coded 1 and “no” coded 0). In the online survey, the respondents 
who provided a negative answer to this question were taken to a short informative text 
describing the ECI. Thus, irrespective of their knowledge about the ECI, all respondents could 
answer the question about the willingness to use it. The latter (H2) is measured through the 
answers provided to the question “Would you sign a European Citizens Initiative on any 
topic?” Possible answers were recorded on a three-point ordinal scale: “no” (0), “maybe” 
(1), and “yes” (2).  
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Democratic perception about the EU is operationalized through the question 
“Overall, in your opinion, how democratic is the EU?” Available answers range from “not at 
all democratic” to “completely democratic” and were coded on a 0-4 ordinal scale. The 
variable about how represented respondents feel in the EU corresponds to the question: 
“How well-represented do you feel in the EU?” Possible answers were also coded on a five-
point ordinal scale having at extremes “not at all” (0) and “very well” (4). The variable about 
interests of citizens was operationalized through the question “In your opinion, to what 
extent does the EU serve the interests of its citizens?” with answers ranging from “not at all” 
(0) to “completely” (4). The EU citizenship variable was operationalized with the question 
“Do you consider yourself to be an EU citizen?” where available answers range from “not at 
all” (0) to “completely” (4). The three socio-demographic variables were operationalized as 
follows: age in years at the moment of survey, gender as a dichotomous variable (1=female, 
2=male), and education as country sensitive. Both German and British respondents had six 
answer possibilities on an ordinal scale to name their level of education, with values starting 
from “Hauptschulabschluss” (Germany) and “GCSE level education” (UK) coded with 0. 
"Hochschulabschluss" coded with 4 was the highest level of education in the German 
questionnaire, “Degree or Graduate education” coded with 5 was the highest in the British. 
The relationships between variables are in a first phase tested through bivariate 
correlations (non-parametric since all variables are ordinal). This is reveals the strength and 
direction of relationships but does not shed light on causality. To identify the latter, we use 
multivariate statistical analysis (ordinal logistic regression) to see the explanatory power of 
the independent variables. Before running the regression analysis we have checked for 
multicolinearity. There correlation between any of the variables in either of the countries is 
not very high; the largest value is 0.67m between how well citizens feel represented by the 
EU and how the EU serves the interests of the citizens; all other values are considerably 
lower than this. More important for the discussion at the end of the paper, the correlations 
between the determinants for which we control and the knowledge or willingness to us the 
ECI are low or very low. The highest value is 0.19 (UK) and 0.20 (Germany), both statistically 
significant at 0.01 for EU citizenship. 
 
The limited role of the ECI  
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The distribution of respondents on the dependent variable of this study, i.e. image about the 
EU (Figure 1) in Germany and the UK reveals important differences. For example, 3% of the 
German respondents have a completely negative image about the EU, while in the UK this 
answer has been given by 11% of the respondents. Furthermore, 60% of the German 
respondents have a rather positive image about the EU compared to 41% of the British 
respondents. However, when it comes to the category of respondents with a very good 
image about the EU, the results are somewhat counterintuitive. In the UK, 19% of the 
respondents, the second largest answer group, fall in this category compared to only 6% in 
Germany. If we cumulate the percentages for the two answers that reflect positive image 
about the EU (rather positive and definitely positive), we observe a small difference: 66% in 
Germany and 60% in the UK. This finding is in line with the distribution from the 2014 
Eurobarometer (with a probability representative sample) where the difference was of 8 
percentage points in favor of Germany. As a final note, the distribution in the extreme 
categories both in Germany and the UK are quite balanced: 3 and 6% in Germany and 11 and 
19% in the UK. There are significantly more British respondents being placed in these 
categories (30%) compared to Germany (9%). 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of respondents according to their image about the EU (%) 
 
 
The distribution of respondents according to their knowledge about the ECI (Figure 2) is 
fairly similar between Germany and the UK. In Germany 36% have heard about it, while in 
the UK 31% respondents answered affirmatively. The low percentages are somewhat 
unexpected given the profile of many respondents in the survey. Usually, the young and 
highly educated are inclined to acquire information and are exposed to various sources. One 
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of these sources, and a very important one for information about the ECI, is Internet where 
young people are considerably more active (and skilled) compared to those from older 
generations. The very similar distribution shows that among the respondents included in this 
study the knowledge about the ECI is not influenced by country specific factors, e.g. different 
media coverage or a different relation of the state government with the EU. Looking at the 
aggregate percentages from Figures 1 and 2, where most respondents have a positive image 
about the EU and know nothing about the ECI, it appears to be no relationship between the 
two variables.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of respondents according to their knowledge about the ECI (%) 
 
 
The distribution of respondents on the variable about the willingness to use the ECI (Figure 
3) is surprising in light of the differences registered for the previous two variables. Although 
respondents in Germany have a slightly better image about the EU and more of them heard 
about the ECI, they are more reluctant to use it compared to the British respondents. The 
individual level correlation between knowledge about the ECI and willingness to use it reflect 
this ambiguity: it is no relationship among the German respondents (-0.01) and a weak 
negative relationship among UK respondents (-0.07) indicating that persons who know less 
about the ECI are slightly more willing to use it than the rest. These results contradict earlier 
arguments according to which the ECI tends to target those citizens who are already 
convinced, having biases and being a form of functional representation. When asked 
whether they would use the ECI on any topic only 10% said yes, and 56%, more than half of 
the respondents answered negatively. In the UK, 47% of the respondents are indecisive and 
say maybe they would use it, and the rest are split almost evenly between a clear decision to 
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use it (26%) and being against it (27%). These general observations blur even further the 
picture of the relationship between the ECI and the image about the EU. To draw substantial 
conclusions and to avoid ecological fallacy, we complement these observations with 
individual level analyses.   
 
Figure 3: Distribution of respondents according to their willingness to use the ECI (%) 
 
 
The bivariate correlations (Table 1) confirm at individual level the poor linkage between 
attitudes towards the ECI (knowledge and desire to use it) and towards the EU (image) 
observed at aggregate level. Due to the small and non-probabilistic sample, generalizations 
to the entire population is not possible; under these circumstances, the reported statistical 
significance has to be seen only as an indicator for no accidental relationships. This is the 
reason for which we focus more on the strength and direction of empirical evidence. There 
is weak empirical support for H1 in both countries. According to the values of the correlation 
coefficients – 0.11 in Germany and 0.13 in the UK, none of them statistically significant – 
there is a weak tendency of those citizens who know about the ECI to have a better image 
about the EU compared to respondents who have no knowledge about the ECI. For H2, the 
correlation coefficients in the two countries differs greatly. In the German case, the 
empirical findings reveal that there is practically no relationship (0.03) between the 
willingness to use the ECI and the image about the EU, while for the British respondents the 
relationship is rather weak (0.18, statistically significant at the 0.05 level) and goes in the 
hypothesized direction.  
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Table 1: The results of the bivariate analysis 
Correlation between the image  Germany  United Kingdom  
about the EU and… Correlation coefficient N Correlation coefficient N 
ECI knowledge (H1) 0.11 237 0.13 210 
ECI willingness to use (H2) 0.03 211 0.18* 190 
EU democratic 0.46** 237 0.66** 210 
EU representative 0.49** 230 0.63** 198 
EU serves interests 0.61* 230 0.62* 198 
EU citizenship 0.48** 237 0.70** 217 
Gender -0.01 223 -0.10 188 
Age -0.05 218 -0.11 182 
Education 0.01 223 0.10 190 
  Notes: The coefficients are rank correlations (Spearman). 
 **significant at 0.01; *significant at 0.05 
 
All other correlations between potential determinants are much stronger and statistically 
significant than H1 and H2. As a general note, the values of the correlation coefficients are 
higher in the UK than in Germany. The correlation between how well respondents consider 
the EU to serve the interests of the citizens and the image about the EU is the strongest 
among German respondents (0.61, statistically significant at 0.05). In the British case, the 
highest value of the correlation coefficient is for how much respondents identified with the 
EU (0.70, statistically significant at 0.01). The correlations for the perception of EU as 
democratic are significant at the 0.01 level and they are strong (0.46) for German 
respondents and very strong (0.66) for British respondents. Accordingly, there is a high 
tendency of citizens who see the EU as democratic to have a better image about the EU 
compared to the rest of respondents. A similar situation is for how well respondents feel 
represented by the EU with significant correlations at the 0.01 level in both cases. There is 
also strong empirical evidence indicating that respondents who consider the EU to serve the 
interests of the citizens (0.61 in Germany and 0.62 in the UK) and the identification with the 
EU (0.48 in Germany and 0.70 in the UK) are positively correlated with the image about the 
EU. The socio-demographic variables do not correlate with the image about the EU in 
Germany. In the UK, there are weak correlations indicating that female, younger, and better 
educated respondents are likely to have a more positive image about the EU than the rest.   
To test for the effect of the ECI variables on image about the EU when the other 
determinants are held constant we run an ordinal logistic regression (Table 2) with the most 
negative answer as reference category. There are two models for each sample, one without 
and one with socio-demographic control variables. All four models are quite a good fit for 
the data, the values of the pseudo R2 being slightly higher for the UK respondents. The 
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results of the regression analysis show a somewhat different picture than the bivariate 
analysis and complicate the interpretation. When all other variables are constant, the 
knowledge about the ECI (H1) has a negative effect on the image about the EU. Those 
respondent who heard about the ECI are approximately 1.5 times less likely (0.76, we 
interpret the reciprocals for all OR lower than 1) to have a positive image about the EU 
compared to those respondents who know nothing about the ECI. The situation is fairly 
similar when controlling for age, gender, and education. These effects go against the 
hypothesized relationship. In the UK, there is no effect of knowledge about the ECI but when 
controlling for the three socio-demographic variables the effect is positive; there is weak 
support for H2 only additional controls are introduced. None of these effects is statistically 
significant.  
 The empirical evidence goes also against H2 among the German respondents. 
Citizens who are willing to use the ECI are less likely to have a good image about the EU than 
those who do not intend to make use of this participation tool. In the UK there is weak 
support for the hypothesized relationship and respondents with the desire to use the ECI are 
1.2 times (or 1.3 times when socio-demographics are controlled for) more likely to have a 
better image compared to the individuals who refuse to use it. None of these effects is 
statistically significant.  
  In contrast, the four determinants for which we controlled have strong or very strong 
effects, all statistically significant. For example, the German respondents who feel that the 
EU serves their interests are more than four times more likely to have a positive image about 
the EU than those who believe the EU does not serve their interests. To use also an example 
from the UK, respondents who identify with the EU are almost three times (2.79, significant 
at 0.01) more likely to have a positive image about the EU compared to those who do not 
identify with the EU. The inclusion of socio-demographic variables rarely changes something 
when it comes to these effects. Among these controls, education appears to have a small 
effect in Germany and gender in the UK (none of these statistical significant), the latter being 
consistent with the observation from the bivariate analysis. 
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Table 2: Ordinal regression models for the image about the EU (odds-ratios) 
 Germany United Kingdom 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
ECI knowledge (H1)        0.76 
      (0.26) 
0.80  
(0.28) 
 1.01  
(0.32) 
  1.23 
 (0.43) 
ECI willingness to use (H2)        0.90  
(0.21) 
0.89  
(0.22) 
       1.20 
 (0.25) 
  1.32 
 (0.30) 
EU democratic     2.08** 
(0.46) 
    1.96** 
(0.45) 
    2.48** 
(0.56) 
     2.69** 
 (0.66) 
EU representative  1.60*  
      (0.36) 
  1.66* 
(0.39) 
  1.61* 
(0.36) 
        1.58  
 (0.38) 
EU serves interests     4.18**  
(1.13) 
    4.27** 
(1.18) 
  1.77* 
(0.46) 
    2.13** 
 (0.59) 
EU citizens      1.67** 
(0.26) 
     1.63** 
(0.26) 
     2.79** 
(0.49) 
    2.64**                                             
(0.52) 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Education 
 0.98  
(0.33) 
      0.91 
     (0.16) 
       1.33 
     (0.26) 
 1.71  
(0.57) 
0.96 
(0.18) 
1.04 
(012) 
N 209 196 185 167 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.38 
LR Chi2 155.73 144.19 197.73 168.12 
Note:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
             **significant at 0.01; *significant at 0.05    
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study tried to empirically assess the relationship between the ECI and the image about 
the EU among citizens from Germany and UK. None of the samples was probabilistic and 
representative at national level and instead included young and highly educated 
respondents. The empirical results reveal that the ECI is a bit far from the great expectations 
that came along with its implementation. Knowledge about the ECI seems to have limited 
effect on respondents’ image about the EU. While the bivariate correlations indicated a 
weak positive relationship between these variables in both countries, the regression analysis 
revealed a more complex picture. In Germany, there is a negative effect of knowledge about 
the ECI on image about the EU when controlling for common determinants identified in the 
literature. In the UK, there is no effect when controlling for the same determinants. 
Similarly, the willingness of the respondents to use the ECI has little impact on the image 
about the EU. In Germany, there is almost no correlation between the two variables and the 
regression analysis indicates a negative effect when controlling for other determinants. In 
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the UK, the correlation is weak and in the hypothesized direction, whereas the regression 
analysis confirms the existence of a weak and positive effect.  
The determinants for which we controlled were not only the ones used in previous 
research, but also related to the issues expected to be enhanced by the ECI. In this sense, 
the existence of a channel for direct participation and involvement was likely to trigger a 
better image about the EU because citizens feel that the political system is more responsive 
to their needs (i.e. more democratic), seek for a better, is open to citizens’ opinions (and 
implicitly pursues their interests). All these are reasons for which we wanted to contrast 
these indirect benefits of the ECI to the direct attitudes of citizens, i.e. how democratic they 
perceive the EU, if they feel represented, if their interests are served, and how much they 
identify with the EU. Since the effect of the ECI was limited and that of the direct attitudes 
was high or very high, it results that the ECI is not perceived as a possible mechanism to 
enhance and promote such traits among the respondents included in our study.  
These observations lead to several theoretical and empirical implications of our 
analysis. First, in addition to problems of design and implementation, the ECI does not 
appear to convey a clear message to citizens. In theory, the ECI is expected to bring the 
European political system closer to citizens and make the latter perceive the EU as being 
more democratic and more responsive to their needs. Indirectly, this shapes a better image 
of the EU. The empirical results show that this does not happen in reality. Citizens do not see 
an immediate link between the ECI and the values it is expected to promote and this was 
reflected in the poor correlations between them. If that is the case, there is a danger that 
the ECI might be used as a negative tool, to hinder EU decision-making process. Equally 
important, knowing and being willing to use the ECI have little effect (or contrasting effect as 
in Germany) when controlling for the attitudes it is expected to enhance. One explanation 
for this situation could be the poor advertisement of the ECI. In this sense, our survey clearly 
pointed out a general lack of knowledge about the ECI. A better sales pitch, with emphasis 
on the advantages provided by this tool, may bring positive reactions among citizens. This 
path is consistent with our observation that the ECI triggers some effects in the more 
Eurosceptic environment of the UK compared to Germany.  
Furthermore, this study indicated almost no relationship between knowledge about 
the ECI and willingness to use it. More puzzling, among the British respondents there is a 
slight tendency of those who knew nothing about the ECI to use it after they were briefly 
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informed about it. This observation further substantiates the idea that the ECI is poorly 
promoted and citizens who have already heard about it are not persuaded to make use. At 
the same time, it may be the perception that the ECI does not fulfill the functions that are 
advertised with it, being instead merely a petition. Highly educated people are likely to be 
more analytical when they are presented with new avenues for participation and thus 
become more critical towards it. In that respect, an emphasis on the benefits that the ECI 
could bring to citizens may foster willingness to use it and, indirectly, contribute to a better 
image about the EU. Furthermore, there are also difficulties (related to the requirements, 
design and application) to launch and implement the ECI, which is more a collective rather 
than an individual effort. As soon as people are aware about shortcomings there are two 
contradictory effects: some continue to believe in its idea and strive for its use (if they 
remain optimistic), while others are demotivated.  
While these implications have to be considered in the limited context of our study, 
they also set important grounds for further research. To begin with, it is worthy to 
investigate if the trends identified here hold for representative samples in a larger number 
of EU member states. Since our results indicated that the ECI alone does not foster a positive 
image about the EU, further research could check whether particular attitudes can be 
combined with knowledge about or willingness to use the ECI to provide positive effects on 
the EU. This will allow for a better understanding about how the ECI could function or how it 
could be better promoted to reach the EU citizens.  
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